1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 11
7	GERALD FRANCIS,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New Yorl January 9, 2020
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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19	New York, NY 10038
20	SAMUEL Z. GOLDFINE, ADA NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
21	Attorney for Respondent
22	One Hogan Place New York, NY 10013
23	
24	Penina Wolick: Official Court Transcriber
25	Official Court HallScribe



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this				
2	afternoon's calendar is appeal number 11, The People of the				
3	State of New York v. Gerald Francis.				
4	Good afternoon, Counsel.				
5	MR. FERGUSON: Good afternoon, Your Honors.				
6	Harold Ferguson for appellant, Gerald Francis. We'd like				
7	to request two minutes for rebuttal.				
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.				
9	MR. FERGUSON: It's this is a strange				
10	situation. A client we file a motion				
11	JUDGE FEINMAN: So so how do you get around				
12	the plain language of the statute?				
13	MR. FERGUSON: The plain language of the statute?				
14	Very simple. The decision here is we filed a motion, it				
15	was denied. That decision is adverse to my client.				
16	JUDGE GARCIA: But that's not what the statute				
17	says. I think going to Judge Feinman's point, it doesn't				
18	say the decision is adverse, right? What does the statute				
19	say?				
20	MR. FERGUSON: It's talking about any issue of				
21	law, any matter of fact, that was decided adversely to the				
22	appellant. The issue here is you're looking at a court				
23	that has engrafted a standard onto the 440.20 statute that				
24	doesn't exist.				

JUDGE STEIN: Well, let's talk about 440.20 for a

1	second. I I'm not sure I see how 440.20 even			
2	contemplates a motion to to challenge an illegally			
3	low sentence. What what that statute says is that -			
4	that setting aside the the illegal sentence,			
5	right, doesn't invalidate the status of the underlying			
6	conviction, and the court must resentence to the correct			
7	sentence.			
8	MR. FERGUSON: That's correct, Your Honor.			
9	JUDGE STEIN: All right. So here, the court			
10	can't do that, right, because it would present double-			
11	jeopardy problems, right?			
12	MR. FERGUSON: No, it doesn't present a double-			
13	jeopardy problem, because by filing this motion, my client			
14	is waiving any double-jeopardy issue.			
15	JUDGE GARCIA: Do you have any case that says you			
16	can do that that you can waive double-jeopardy?			
17	MR. FERGUSON: But it			
18	JUDGE GARCIA: Is there any case law on that?			
19	MR. FERGUSON: It's any time the defendant is			
20	- any time the defendant tries to overturn any conviction,			
21	it is, in essence			
22	JUDGE GARCIA: Waiving double-jeopardy?			
23	MR. FERGUSON: avoiding a double-jeopardy			
24	claim, Your Honor.			
25	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I thought that double-			

jeopardy waivers were limited to instances like a mistrial, and - - - and I think there's case law on that. But I know of no other instance, unless you - - - I'll look at it, if you tell me there's one, but - - -

MR. FERGUSON: But Your Honor, here, again, we want - - - we want you to look at what is a plenary statute.

JUDGE GARCIA: So you're saying if you went back and you won here, you've waived that double-jeopardy argument, so the court now could say okay, you get two years; go in for a year? Because that's what you're doing by waiving the double-jeopardy argument, right?

MR. FERGUSON: Well, what - - what our - - - what my client is attempting to do is, my client has now been released on parole.

JUDGE GARCIA: No, I know. But let's say they don't buy your argument that it - - - because you misrepresent - - - your client misrepresented his identity to the court, you're not getting our plea back, so now you're going to get two years, go in for a year. You've waived double-jeopardy.

MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, that - - - but that's not what DaForno cite. What The People cited in DaForno was there the defendant was advised that if, in fact, he had had another conviction, that therefore he wouldn't have

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1
        the opportunity to get his plea back. There was no such
2
        thing in - - -
 3
                  JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say they don't give you
 4
        your plea back. Could - - - you've waived double-jeopardy;
5
        could you get more time now - - -
 6
                  MR. FERGUSON: Absolutely.
 7
                  JUDGE GARCIA: - - - since you - - - so you
 8
        could?
9
                  MR. FERGUSON: Absolutely. And in fact - - -
10
                  JUDGE FAHEY: So wouldn't you - - -
                  MR. FERGUSON: - - - and in fact that's - - -
11
                  JUDGE FAHEY: - - - wouldn't you - - - wait a
12
13
        minute.
14
                  MR. FERGUSON: - - - that's exactly what my
15
        client - -
16
                  JUDGE FAHEY: Excuse me.
17
                  MR. FERGUSON: - - - that - - -
18
                  JUDGE FAHEY: Wouldn't you then - - if he gives
        you - - - you did time. You finished. You got six plus -
19
20
        - - plus probation right, on the '88; is that right?
21
                  MR. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor.
22
                  JUDGE FAHEY: Six plus - - - so then he'd go
23
        back. But it was two-to-four that he could have gotten; is
24
        that correct?
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MR. FERGUSON: That was the minimum that he would

have gotten.

JUDGE FAHEY: Right. All right. So let's go - - he goes back and he gets two-to-four, isn't that subject
to an immediate double-jeopardy challenge?

MR. FERGUSON: But Your Honor, he's looking - - - what Mr. - - - what Mr. Francis is looking here, is the opportunity to take this case back to trial. When he gets his plea back, he would be looking for exoneration here.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

MR. FERGUSON: When this - - - when filed this originally - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: I understand - - - I understand what you want to do. But there's - - - there's - - - you have no right to say that that's going to happen.

The second thing you have no right to say is going to happen, you go back, and you get to four - - - you get a reconsideration, and it's denied, some 440.20 motion. It's just simply denied again.

I guess what I'm saying is, I understand how you argue it's adversely effective. It's an intelligent argument. My question is, is your argument is predicated on outcomes that are not guaranteed and that it seems like a trial court has the right to exercise, for instance, in sentencing, on an amount of discretion that will automatically create legal problems that abolish the right

that you're trying to achieve.

MR. FERGUSON: I don't agree with that, Your Honor.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

MR. FERGUSON: Again, I want to - - - I - - - looking at 440.20, as it is, and it was amended in 1995, and it was expanded as to scope, there is nothing in that statute that says you can't - - - that there is an aggrieved-by-the-error standard. There's nothing in that statute that says I can't go back in and challenge my client's sentence as being illegally low. The legislature had the opportunity to do so. They chose not to do so.

Here, when this began, the goal of my client was to try and get out from under his mandatory violent persistent felony offender - -

JUDGE FAHEY: I understand.

MR. FERGUSON: - - - status. He has now been released on parole. I spoke to him again this morning to ensure myself that he understood that the possibility now is that if - - - if we were successful, and this gets - - - and again, all we're asking for is an appellate review by the Appellate Division on this issue - - - is that the possibility is this could lead to you being reprosecuted on a 1987 case; you could be reconvict - - - you could be convicted after trial, and you could go back to prison.

1	And he says he understands that, and that's	
2	exactly how he wishes to proceed here. So	
3	JUDGE FAHEY: So this falls under the category o	
4		
5	JUDGE FEINMAN: Like the	
6	JUDGE FAHEY: this falls under the categor	
7	of be careful what you ask for in life?	
8	MR. FERGUSON: Well, Your Honor, the this	
9	this was a whole series of cases that I had with Mr.	
10	Gould, Mr. Benjamin, and Mr. Francis all together.	
11	JUDGE WILSON: He's taking he's taking his	
12	chances that in a thirty-three-year-old prosecution, the	
13	witnesses may not be around anymore?	
14	MR. FERGUSON: That but again, Your Honor,	
15	this was a simple gun possession case. All you would need	
16	is the the element of operability there, and	
17	something of the arresting officer who would have been abl	
18	to testify. So we're not talking about some complicated	
19	case that's involved here.	
20	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, but we don't know where the	
21	arresting officer is.	
22	MR. FERGUSON: No, we don't know where the	
23	arresting officer is.	
24	JUDGE FEINMAN: Thirty-three years, there's a	
25	good chance he's retired or she's retired, but	

MR. FERGUSON: But I - - - I'd like to go back to Judge Garcia's point about that - - - that he falsely gave his name. We don't know that.

JUDGE GARCIA: He forgot his name?

MR. FERGUSON: No, no. We don't know under what circumstance that he was prosecuted under the name of Gerald Francis. There's nothing in this record that indicates that - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: No, but knows when he stands up in front of the court, and they're saying you - - - you, whoever you are, don't have a prior conviction, he knows that's not true. He knows he has a prior conviction.

MR. FERGUSON: Again, Your Honor, there was nothing in the plea colloquy that talked about a prior conviction whatsoever. That's DaForno, which The People are relying upon. There is nothing that - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: And then next time - - - and it seems to me that every time this happens, and it happens two or three times, where he has used a different name to avoid being sentenced as a predicate for whatever past he does have, he gets out of it, until the last time when they - - maybe because of technology, they connect all these aliases he's, in one way or another, been using.

So at the end, in '97, he gets the twenty-three to life sentence. And now it seems - - - and very openly,



1 have you admitted this strategy - - - is the mirror of that 2 strategy to try to take out these convictions based on the 3 fact that they didn't know his real identity and do exactly 4 what he did before, which is avoid the predicate status, in 5 this case, by manipulating the timing of the convictions 6 and sentences. 7 MR. FERGUSON: But again, it's not a matter of 8 game - -9 JUDGE GARCIA: What kind of message is that? I 10 mean, as - - -11 MR. FERGUSON: No - - -12 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - an adverse result for your 13 client? 14 MR. FERGUSON: But Your Honor, here - - - may I 15 answer, Your Honor? 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, of course. 17 MR. FERGUSON: What we're talking about here is 18 assumptions that are being made, and that in the five 19 months that this case continued to exist, from the time of 20 arraignment to eventually plea and sentence, that at no 21 point - - - it was simple. All you had to do was run his 22 fingerprints through SAFIS and it would have come out. 23



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much better than this that was then pulled off the table,

JUDGE GARCIA: In '97 he had an offer that was

right? 1 2 MR. FERGUSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: And why was it withdrawn? 4 MR. FERGUSON: It was withdrawn because they 5 realized what his correct status was at that time. 6 JUDGE GARCIA: Right, which he hadn't revealed 7 until that point. 8 MR. FERGUSON: And again, you're - - - you're 9 assuming that my client is somehow versed in the law, prior 10 to 1997, Your Honor. JUDGE GARCIA: Based on three prior convictions. 11 12 I am assuming that. 13 MR. FERGUSON: Based on his prior convictions. 14 But any type of research that this individual did was post 15 his 1997 conviction. That's when he got directly involved 16 into doing legal research and the like. 17 So to say that this is a level of gamesmanship -18 - - and I - - - I do want to point out that what The People 19 have attempted to do in other cases - - - and we had People 20 v. Perry, which was mooted out before this court - - - The 21 People's goal is to have 470.15 declared unconstitutional 22 as stripping the appellate courts of jurisdiction, running 23 afoul of the New York State Constitution. 24 So for The People to come back here now and say

oh, we're going to use this and say, oh, yes, 470.15 works

2 and overturn that in a subsequent case, that - - - talking 3 about gamesmanship, that's gamesmanship too, Your Honor. 4 As I - - - here, there's no doubt his sentence 5 was illegal. This - - - there was nothing in 440.20 that 6 prevented him from doing this. And that for - - - to allow a trial court judge to change a - - -7 8 JUDGE STEIN: The question is, is whether he's 9 entitled to have that review - - - that decision reviewed 10 on appeal. 11 MR. FERGUSON: Right. But what you ow - - - what 12 you would be doing was allowing here, a trial court judge, 13 by judicial fiat, to amend a state statute that's the 14 province of the legislature that's not the province of a 15 trial court judge. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 17 MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel? 19 MR. GOLDFINE: Thank you, Your Honors, and may it 20 please the court. Samuel Goldfine, on behalf of The 21 People. 22 Below, at the 440 court, defendant complained 23 that his sentence was illegally lenient. That motion was 24 denied, and on appeal the Appellate Division recognized

when it goes against the defendant, but we're going to try

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that defendant was obviously not adversely affected by that

sentencing error. He manifestly benefited from it. He had created it. And as a result, that 470.15 barred its consideration of the merits of the case.

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Now, there's been a lot of discussion about 440.20, but respectfully, I think that's irrelevant to this case. Whether or not the underlying decision was right or wrong, the question on appeal is whether or not 470.15, which governs the scope of the Appellate Division's jurisdiction, applies here. And plainly, under the plain language of the statute, it does.

Defendant benefited from the sentencing error.

And accordingly, he was not adversely affected by it.

The notion that 440.20, that the denial itself, could be the error, contravenes the plain language of the statute. I think Judge - -- Judge Garcia pointed out that it was the error or defect in the criminal court proceeding underlying that order, not the order itself.

And defendant's reading of the statute renders that adverse effect language largely pointless. Anything could be made adverse, as in this case, by raising it unsuccessfully below.

Also turning to the idea that defendant didn't give false names for some kind of purpose - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What's - - - what's the only basis the Appellate Division - - - what's the basis the Appellate

1 Division gave for saying it had no jurisdiction? 2 MR. GOLDFINE: The Appellate Division's basis was 3 that defendant was not adversely affected by the sentencing error that he identified. 4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so - - - yes, but the - - -6 why is that correct, if his point is he's got a motion 7 that's denied and that they have jurisdiction to determine 8 that, and then they can reach the merits? That point is on 9 the merits. 10 MR. GOLDFINE: Well, I think the - - 470.15 is 11 going to require some examination of the underlying facts, 12 because the statute is commanding the appellate court to go 13 beyond the mere - - - beyond the order and to look at the 14 impact on the defendant, whether or not there was an 15 adverse effect from the specific error or defect in the 16 sentence. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, he's - - - unless I 18 misunderstood him, and I'm sure he'll correct me when he 19 gets up on rebuttal, I - - - I thought the argument was the 20 denial of the motion meant that the court is not exercising 2.1 the jurisdiction that the CPL provides to determine whether 2.2 or not the denial of the motion is correct? 23 MR. GOLDFINE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: And that he is aggrieved because 25 of that.

Ultimately, yes, sure, the AD may very well hold against him on the merits.

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MR. GOLDFINE: I think the legislature has just expressed a clear intent that the appellate court shouldn't be wasting resources on a case where the defendant cannot point to an adverse effect that he suffered here. And plainly, the sentencing defect did not harm defendant in any way. There was no adverse effect there.

He benefited from it to such a degree that he continued to lie to the authorities about his identity and obtained a similar sentencing benefit in a subsequent case.

JUDGE RIVERA: I - - - I thought, again, that his argument - - - and again, he'll correct me if I'm wrong - - - the argument he's making is the adverse effect is that he doesn't have appellate review of what he's arguing is an incorrect determination about the sentencing.

MR. GOLDFINE: I - - - I believe that contravenes the plain language of the statute. It's - - - the denial of the order itself is not enough. It's what's the impact on the defense. And here, there's no impact.

I mean, even if you're to assume that the error could be this long chain of litigation that's going to result in him unsettling his richly deserved predicate status, that he doesn't say there's any reason he doesn't deserve that; he committed all those crimes - - - that's

beyond the scope of the statute.

JUDGE FAHEY: And you know, it's - - - I guess - - - I think - - - when I think about it, when I struggled with this case, as we all have - - - it breaks down into two parts: what's the meaning of "adversely affected"; and how broad of a meaning should we give that?

And sentence-by-sentence, I think you're absolutely right. It's - - - it's - - - he's not adversely affected. But in the context of recidivist statutes, it becomes more complicated and more difficult to determine where you draw the line for whether somebody's adversely affected or not.

And that - - - that's why I was asking the questions about double-jeopardy, because it seems to me that if we found that there was double-jeopardy here, that it wouldn't be necessary for us to - - - to engage in that analysis, would it?

MR. GOLDFINE: Right, Your Honor. Well, I think the statute itself does narrow the scope to a certain degree.

JUDGE FAHEY: No, but stay with my question. If we found - - - if we found that double-jeopardy applied here, would we need to engage in the "adversely affected"



analysis that both Counsel have argued for us? 1 2 MR. GOLDFINE: No - - - no, Your Honor. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: I see. 4 MR. GOLDFINE: Because at that point, there -5 there's no possible - - - there's no adverse effect. 6 defendant would be left in the situation he's in now. 7 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 8 MR. GOLDFINE: He - - - he most likely couldn't 9 be resentenced because of double-jeopardy, and the - - -10 the status quo would remain. There's no adverse effect. 11 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, to get to that double-12 jeopardy argument, though, we would first, at least, have 13 to assume that there could be an adverse effect - - - it's 14 possible - - - in a contingent proceeding, essentially, 15 That you could go back after you get a good - - -16 after you get your un-lenient - - - your unlawfully lenient 17 sentence overturned, you could go back and use that to undo 18 your plea, and then you could take that undoing of your 19 plea and go and undo your sentence on the '97 conviction. 20 But if we adhere to a rule that says you look at this proceeding and what was being challenged here and the 21 22 result, we never get to the double-jeopardy issue, do we? 23 MR. GOLDFINE: Correct, Your Honor. And I think 24 that that narrowing of the scope is in the plain language 25 of the statute. It's not an adverse effect that may have

1 affected the defendant in any criminal court proceeding, 2 it's "the" criminal court proceeding. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 4 MR. GOLDFINE: And I think that narrowing is for 5 a specific purpose, because it's hard to imagine another 6 circumstance where this type of claim would arise. 7 The legislature is trying to tamp down on these 8 types of appeals where the heart of them is really 9 gamesmanship. Even the correction that defendant is 10 seeking is not to have a correct sentence imposed. He now wants his plea back. And at thirty years after the fact, 11 12 it's likely impossible that the police officers are alive 13 or that they remember what happened, that the paperwork is 14 still available to prosecute this conviction. 15 In reality, if defendant is entitled to withdraw 16 his plea, he's going to have an acquittal here. 17 If there are no further questions, I rest on my 18 brief and ask that you affirm. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 20 MR. GOLDFINE: Thank you, Your Honor. 2.1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel? 2.2 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, is that your argument for 23 harm in this proceeding, that be - - - it's because the 24 Appellate Division refused to review the underlying issue?

MR. FERGUSON: Absolutely, Your Honor.

1	JUDGE GARCIA: But then wouldn't any time		
2	they apply 470.15, wouldn't you have harm? Like any time		
3	you apply that statute, you're not getting a review, for		
4	whatever reason, so you always are harmed, so it's kind a		
5	Catch-22, right?		
6	So any time you apply 470.15, I'm harmed. So		
7	there's an adverse effect, even though there's not an		
8	adverse effect leading to the application		
9	MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, this time it's		
10	whenever there is a motion filed that is denied, that a		
11	defendant has filed, that denial is adverse to the		
12	defendant.		
13	JUDGE GARCIA: I understand that argument.		
14	MR. FERGUSON: Right.		
15	JUDGE GARCIA: I understand that argument. But -		
16	but you're not arguing because they applied 470.15 and		
17	didn't review that, that's your harm?		
18	MR. FERGUSON: Right.		
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Your harm is the denial of your		
20	original motion?		
21	MR. FERGUSON: That's correct, Your Honor.		
22	JUDGE GARCIA: Right.		
23	MR. FERGUSON: And to go back, it's we have		
24	to take a look at 440.20 in the context of how it was		
25	amended It was amended in 1995 in direct response to the		

1	reinstitution of capital punishment in the State of New
2	York.
3	And therefore, they expanded the scope of 440.20
4	to help defendants who were facing the possibility of
5	death, so that you have a statute
6	JUDGE STEIN: Not to help them set aside an
7	illegally low
8	MR. FERGUSON: That's correct, Your Honor.
9	JUDGE STEIN: sentence.
10	MR. FERGUSON: Because that would be used
11	because those all of those factors could have been
12	used as aggravating factors.
13	JUDGE STEIN: But also 440.20.
14	MR. FERGUSON: That's right, Your Honor.
15	JUDGE STEIN: Right? It wasn't designed to allow
16	defendants to set aside illegally low sentences.
17	MR. FERGUSON: There is it is written as a
18	plenary statute. There is no exception to it.
19	When they looked at it in 1995, and they decided
20	to amend it, they the legislature had the province,
21	if they wanted to, to said (sic) it only applies to
22	illegally high sentences. But here, there is no exception
23	whatsoever in 440.20.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: So if so if the court

disagrees with his argument about whether or not merely a

1	denial of the motion in and of itself is enough to get you	
2	the aggrievement, do you lose? Do we have to affirm?	
3	MR. FERGUSON: I hope not.	
4	JUDGE RIVERA: No, the question of law as a	
5	question of law. I know you have some other basis.	
6	MR. FERGUSON: I think we have to look at the	
7	- the the over the overall policy	
8	considerations here. And part of the policy considerations	
9	here is what, in effect, has occurred in this particular	
10	case is a trial court judge looks at a plenary statute and	
11	added an exception that does not exist in the statutory	
12	language. And the Appellate Division is avoiding looking	
13	at amendment by judicial fiat.	
14	That can't be allowed by this court. All we're	
15	asking for is a review by the Appellate Division of the	
16	merits.	
17	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.	
18	MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Your Honors.	
19	(Court is adjourned)	
20		
21		
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23		
	II	



1		CERTIFICATION		
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5	People of the State of New York v. Gerald Francis, No. 11			
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